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Abstract:	A	heated	debate	surrounds	the	significance	of	reproducibility	as	an	indicator	for	research	quality	and	reliability,	with	many	commentators	linking	a	“crisis	of	reproducibility”	to	the	rise	of	fraudulent,	careless	and	unreliable	practices	of	knowledge	production.	Through	the	analysis	of	discourse	and	practices	across	research	fields,	I	point	out	that	reproducibility	is	not	only	interpreted	in	different	ways,	but	also	serves	a	variety	of	epistemic	functions	depending	on	the	research	at	hand.	Given	such	variation,	I	argue	that	the	uncritical	pursuit	of	reproducibility	as	an	overarching	epistemic	value	is	misleading	and	potentially	damaging	to	scientific	advancement.	Requirements	for	reproducibility,	however	they	are	interpreted,	are	one	of	many	available	means	to	secure	reliable	research	outcomes.	Furthermore,	there	are	cases	where	the	focus	on	enhancing	reproducibility	turns	out	not	to	foster	high-quality	research.	Scientific	communities	and	Open	Science	advocates	should	learn	from	inferential	reasoning	from	irreproducible	data,	and	promote	incentives	for	all	researchers	to	explicitly	and	publicly	discuss	(1)	their	methodological	commitments,	(2)	the	ways	in	which	they	learn	from	mistakes	and	problems	in	everyday	practice,	and	(3)	the	strategies	they	use	to	choose	which	research	component	of	any	project	needs	to	be	preserved	in	the	long	term,	and	how.				
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Introduction:	The	Reproducibility	Crisis		The	reproducibility	of	research	results	is	often	flagged	as	a	priority	in	scientific	research,	a	fundamental	form	of	validation	for	data	and	a	major	motivation	for	open	data	policies	(Royal	Society	2012,	Science	International	2015).	The	epistemic	significance	attributed	to	reproducibility	has	recently	become	poignant	as	a	result	of	the	failure	of	studies	aiming	to	reproduce	the	results	of	well-established,	published	research	in	the	fields	of	molecular	biology	(Ioannidis	et	al	2012),	experimental	psychology	(Open	Science	Collaboration	2015;	Baker	2015)	and	clinical	medicine	(Prinz	et	al	2011;	Begley	and	Ellis	2012).	The	findings	of	these	“reproducibility	tests”	have	been	published	and	commented	upon	in	prominent	international	journals	within	science	and	beyond	(e.g.	as	the	main	feature	in	a	2013	issue	of	The	Economist),	causing	widespread	worry	and	uproar.	Failure	to	reproduce	results	was	taken	to	indicate,	at	best,	problems	in	the	design	and	methods	used	by	the	researchers	in	question,	and	at	worst,	a	fundamental	lack	of	credibility	for	the	knowledge	thereby	obtained	–	a	position	reminiscent	of	Karl	Popper’s	pronouncement	that	“non-reproducible	single	occurrences	are	of	no	significance	to	science”	(1959,	64).	In	2015,	Nature	published	a	full	special	issue	on	the	“challenges	of	irreproducible	research”	(http://www.nature.com/news/reproducibility-1.17552),	which	included	a	cartoon	showing	the	ruins	of	the	temple	of	“robust	science”	[figure	1].		
Figure	1.	From	Nature,	September	15,	2015.	Reproduced	by	courtesy	of	Nature	
Publishing	Group.		
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Many	commentators	pointed	to	the	lack	of	reproducibility	as	a	signal	that,	due	to	increasing	administrative,	social	and	financial	pressures,	scientists	are	becoming	sloppier	and	eager	to	publish	as	soon	as	feasible,	without	taking	adequate	time	and	effort	to	verify	the	reliability	of	their	results.	This	encourages	the	generation	of	low-quality	research	outcomes,	which	should	not	be	relied	upon	as	sources	of	knowledge.	This	so-called	“crisis	of	reproducibility”	has	also	been	linked	to:	ineffectual	practices	of	quality	control	and	self-correction	within	journals,	resulting	in	the	failure	to	pick	up	serious	errors	and	unreliable	results	at	the	refereeing	stage	(Allen	et	al,	2016);	a	general	increase	in	the	complexity	and	scale	of	experiments	and	related	statistical	analyses	of	results,	with	increasing	specialization	and	division	of	labor	resulting	in	lack	of	clarity	around	who	is	actually	responsible	for	quality	checks	(Leonelli	2017a);	widespread	cognitive	bias	among	researchers,	who	end	up	reinforcing	each	other’s	preexisting	beliefs	and	setting	up	research	plans	and	validation	procedures	accordingly	(Bem,	Utts	and	Johnson	2011);	questionable	uses	of	statistical	techniques	to	smoothen	bias	and	exclude	uncomfortable	results	(e.g.	the	practice	of	p-hacking	and	selective	reporting;	Simmons,	Nelson	and	Simonsohn	2011,	Fanelli	2012);	and	lack	of	transparency	and	effective	critical	debate	around	research	methods	and	data,	which	makes	it	impossible	for	researchers	outside	any	given	project	to	scrutinize	its	results	(Science	International	2015).	Among	the	potential	consequences	of	the	crisis,	commentators	list	an	increasing	mistrust	in	the	credibility	of	scientific	findings	by	policy-makers	and	citizens,	the	squandering	of	private	and	public	investments	in	the	search	for	new	technologies	and	medical	treatments,	and	permanent	damage	to	the	integrity	and	ethos	of	the	scientific	enterprise	(e.g.	KNAW	2018).	It	is	hardly	possible	to	imagine	higher	stakes	than	these	for	the	world	of	science.	Its	future	existence	and	social	role	seems	to	hinge	on	the	ability	of	researchers	and	scientific	institutions	to	respond	to	the	crisis,	thus	averting	a	complete	loss	of	trust	in	scientific	expertise	by	civil	society.		I	find	many	of	the	critical	reflections	on	the	challenges	presented	by	the	current	scale,	organization	and	methods	of	much	experimental	research	to	be	timely	and	compelling,	and	I	agree	that	traditional	models	of	scientific	publishing	and	public	scrutiny	are	no	longer	fit	for	purpose	within	the	increasingly	globalized,	costly,	technology-dependent	and	multi-disciplinary	landscape	of	contemporary	research	(Leonelli	2016,	2017a/b).	However,	in	this	paper	I	take	issue	with	the	widespread	reference	to	reproducibility	as	an	overarching	epistemic	value	for	science	and	a	good	proxy	measure	for	the	quality	and	reliability	of	research	results.	Reproducibility	comes	in	a	variety	of	forms	geared	to	different	methods	and	goals	in	science.	While	most	commentators	focus	on	the	use	of	reproducibility	as	the	best	strategy	to	achieve	inter-subjectively	reliable	outcomes,	I	shall	argue	that	(1)	such	convergence	of	results	can	be	obtained	in	the	absence	of	reproduction,	and	(2)	a	different,	yet	crucial	function	of	reproducibility	consists	in	helping	researchers	to	identify	relevant	variants	in	
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the	first	place.			My	analysis	is	organized	as	follows.	Taking	inspiration	from	some	of	the	scientific	and	philosophical	discussions	on	reproducibility,	I	discuss	how	the	meaning	of	this	term	can	shift	dramatically	depending	on	what	it	is	applied	to,	and	how.	I	then	review	how	such	variability	plays	out	in	practice	by	identifying	six	broad	types	of	research	associated	with	different	interpretations	of	reproducibility.	I	consider	how	this	variation	is	linked	to	the	degree	of	control	that	researchers	are	able	and	willing	to	exercise	on	their	materials	and	on	the	environment	in	which	their	investigations	take	place,	as	well	as	to	the	extent	to	which	they	rely	on	statistical	methods	in	assessing	the	validity	of	the	evidence	being	produced.	In	studies	where	control	over	environmental	variants	is	only	partially	achieved,	for	instance,	reproduction	resulting	in	different	outcomes	is	perceived	as	highly	valuable,	since	it	can	signal	hitherto	unknown	sources	of	variation	or	define	the	scope	of	the	hypothesis	being	tested.	By	contrast,	in	studies	that	are	carried	out	in	highly	idiosyncratic	environmental	conditions	and/or	on	perishable	and	rare	samples	which	do	not	lend	themselves	to	statistical	analysis,	it	is	the	very	uniqueness	and	irreproducibility	of	research	conditions	that	makes	the	resulting	data	valuable	as	sources	of	evidence.	In	such	cases,	a	focus	on	enhancing	reproducibility	turns	out	not	to	be	the	best	way	to	foster	high-quality,	robust	research	outcomes.	Rather,	it	is	the	well-informed	analysis	of	how	reliable	and	meaningful	data	are	obtained	through	irreproducible	research	practices	that	increases	the	sophistication	of	research	methods	and	of	the	ways	in	which	they	are	documented	and	disseminated.	This	often	includes	an	emphasis	on	the	triangulation	of	results	obtained	through	a	variety	of	methods	and	under	diverse	circumstances	–	thereby	taking	convergence	among	findings	coming	from	different	sources	as	signaling	the	robustness	and	reliability	of	a	particular	inference.1				I	conclude	that	the	uncritical	pursuit	of	a	narrow	interpretation	of	reproducibility	as	an	overarching	epistemic	value	for	research,	endowed	with	the	power	to	demarcate	science	from	non-science,	is	misleading	and	potentially	damaging	to	scientific	advancement.	Reproducibility	is	not	only	interpreted	in	many	differently	ways,	but	also	serves	a	variety	of	epistemic	functions	depending	on	the	field	and	type	of	research	at	hand.	Requirements	for	reproducibility,	however	they	are	interpreted,	are	thus	only	one	of	the	available	means	to	secure	reliable	research	outcomes.	In	the	final	section	of	the	paper,	I	highlight	the	implications	of	this	argument	for	scientific	communities	and	Open	Science	advocates.		
                                               
1 While maintaining a focus on repetition as a conclusive test, Allan Franklin (1986) discusses other 
several strategies for enhancing trust in experimental results. Chapman and Wylie (2016) provide an 
excellent discussion of triangulation as a key strategy for testing the robustness of inferential reasoning 
in the historical sciences. 
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What	Is	Reproducibility?		Within	both	the	natural	sciences,	the	philosophy	of	science	and	science	studies	there	is	a	wide	variety	of	interpretations	of	the	meaning	and	practical	implications	of	the	term	‘reproducibility’	-	and	of	associated	terms	such	as	replicability	and	repeatability.	This	should	not	be	surprising,	given	the	vast	array	of	goals	and	concerns	related	to	reproducibility	that	exist	across	different	fields	and	approaches	to	research.	Within	applied	domains	such	as	pharmacology	and	clinical	medicine,	reproducibility	is	widely	regarded	as	a	way	to	assess	the	safety	of	very	specific	knowledge	claims	and	related	products	(such	as	drugs),	and	the	circumstances	in	which	such	safety	can	be	guaranteed.	If	an	experiment	fails	to	yield	the	same	results	when	tried	on	different	populations,	for	instance,	reproducibility	can	be	used	as	a	tool	to	investigate	the	range	of	validity	of	the	inferences	being	tested.	Reproducibility	can	also	be	invoked	for	other	goals,	however,	such	as:	the	debugging	of	software	from	errors	in	computer	science	and	informatics;	the	exploration	of	how	and	why	methods	tried	on	different	materials,	or	on	the	same	materials	at	different	times	or	in	different	places,	may	yield	different	outcomes	–	as	is	often	the	case	in	the	life	sciences;	or	the	investigation	of	the	effect	of	researchers’	own	biases,	assumptions	and	interests	on	the	outcomes	of	research	–	a	crucial	issue	particularly	in	experimental	psychology	and	behavioural	economics.2	As	noted	by	Hans	Radder:		 “many	philosophers	assume,	implicitly	or	explicitly,	that	successful	experiments	are	or	should	be	reproducible.	However,	since	“experiment”	is	a	general	term	for	what	in	fact	is	a	rather	complex	process,	the	precise	meaning	of	this	assumption	is	not	clear.	To	clarify	the	notion	of	reproducibility	we	need	to	address	the	following	question:	reproducibility	of	what	and	by	whom?”	(Radder	1996,	16).		This	question	becomes	ever	more	vexing	when	considering	research	that	does	not	rely	on	experimental	techniques	but	rather	on	observational	data,	including	both	quantitative	approaches	such	as	surveys	and	qualitative	methods	such	as	ethnography.	This	landscape	can	be	very	confusing	to	analysts	who	are	trying	to	relate	field-specific	discussions	of	reproducibility	to	each	other,	particularly	since	commentators	tend	to	use	the	same	terms	in	different	ways	–	and	often	to	discuss	different	problems.			Rather	than	attempting	to	review	in	detail	this	myriad	of	terminological	differences,	I	focus	on	two	central	concerns	that	all	commentators	seem	to	agree	
                                               2	Cases	of	reproducibility	failure	in	economics	are	less	widely	discussed,	but	are	no	less	interesting.	Julie	Nelson	re-analysed	existing	studies	suggesting	strong	evidence	for	women	being	more	risk-averse	than	men,	and	showed	how	they	cherry-picked	findings,	used	bogus	statistical	methods	and	visualized	data	in	ways	that	suggested	indefensible	claims	(for	instance,	she	showed	that	as	soon	as	you	visualize	the	data	showing	wide	variation	among	responses	in	both	men	and	women,	the	effect	diminishes	and	it	becomes	clear	that	risk-aversion	is	not	easily	correlated	to	gender	differences	between	individuals;	Nelson	2016).	
 6 
on.3	One	is	the	distinction	between	the	ability	to	obtain	the	same	results	through	the	same	methods,	and	the	ability	to	obtain	the	same	results	through	an	array	of	different	methods.	Radder	refers	to	the	former	as	reproducibility	and	to	the	latter	as	replicability,	thus	associating	the	term	reproducibility	with	the	requirement	to	successfully	repeat	the	whole	of	a	research	procedure	in	order	to	ascertain	the	reliability	of	its	outcomes	(Radder	1996,	2012).	This	in	turn	requires	a	very	high	degree	of	control	over	sources	of	variability	that	may	affect	not	only	the	outcomes,	but	also	the	very	performance	of	an	investigation	(such	as,	for	instance,	whether	researchers	can	reliably	expect	a	certain	set	of	reactions	from	a	given	organism	or	material	under	investigation	to	a	given	environmental	stimulus).			The	second	key	concern	is	what	is	meant	by	‘the	same	outcomes’.	What	commentators	and	researchers	view	as	outcomes	can	encompass	objects	and	processes	at	different	levels	of	abstraction	and	produced	at	different	stages	of	research.	These	range	from	direct	measurements	generated	by	experimental	apparatus	(what	Ian	Hacking	calls	“marks”	and	many	others	refer	to	as	“raw	data”,	to	signal	the	relative	independence	between	the	measurements	and	subsequent	interpretations;	Hacking	1995,	Leonelli	2016)	to	patterns	extracted	from	such	measurements	in	the	form	of	data	models,	causal	generalisations	derived	from	data	analysis	in	the	form	of	knowledge	statements,	or	forms	of	
intervention	such	as	those	used	to	create	a	new	chemical	substance	or	modify	the	structure	of	a	cell.	Whether	outcomes	are	considered	to	be	data,	models,	interventions	or	knowledge	statements	matters	enormously	to	the	interpretation	of	claims	around	reproducibility,	since	the	reproduction	of	the	same	outcomes	can	be	interpreted	as	the	requirement	to	obtain	precisely	the	same	dataset	multiple	times	or,	more	liberally,	as	being	able	to	derive	the	same	patterns	and/or	generalisations	from	that	dataset	multiple	times	and	across	different	circumstances	(even	if	the	data	themselves	are	not	precisely	the	same).		Remarkably,	despite	the	variable	interpretations	of	the	term	that	are	immediately	visible	through	such	basic	considerations,	the	framing	of	reproducibility	used	in	top	science	journals	today	remains	narrowly	linked	to	a	particular	understanding	of	what	good	research	should	look	like.	Most	typically,	reproducibility	is	associated	with	experimental	research	methods	that	yield	numerical	outcomes.	Existing	scholarship	in	the	philosophy	of	measurement	and	experimentation	points	to	at	least	three	reasons	for	this:	(1)	experimentation	aims	to	achieve	a	measure	of	control	over	sources	of	variability	that	may	affect	the	outcomes	of	research,	and	the	higher	the	degree	of	control	that	researchers	have	over	materials	and	set-up,	the	higher	the	chance	that	repeating	experiments	will	yield	the	same	outcomes	(Radder	2012);	(2)	quantitative	outcomes	are	easier	to	compare	with	each	other	and	aggregate	into	patterns	than	other	types	of	data,	thus	enabling	what	looks	like	a	simple	and	immediate	comparison	between	research	outcomes	(Porter	1995);	(3)	numbers	lend	themselves	to	computationally	and	statistically	driven	forms	of	analysis	and	validation,	which	are	often	assumed	to	lend	a	measure	of	mechanical	objectivity	
                                               
3 An excellent review of the various ways in which the term replicability is used in the life sciences, 
with explicit reference to the distinctive phases of research projects, is provided by Shavit and Ellison 
(2017, 9-14).  
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to	the	evaluation	of	research	outcomes	(Daston	and	Galison	1992,	Boumans	2015).	As	these	authors	have	recognised	and	I	discuss	in	the	next	section,	however,	this	approach	to	scientific	research	is	not	the	only	one	yielding	useful	and	reliable	results,	nor	should	it	be	assumed	to	be.	The	interpretation	of	reproducibility	associated	with	this	mode	of	research	works	better	for	certain	methods,	stages	and	goals	of	inquiry	than	for	others,	thus	proving	to	be	inadequate	as	an	overarching	criterion	for	what	reliable,	high-quality	research	needs	to	look	like.			
Reproducibility	in	Scientific	Practice		I	here	reflect	on	how	reproducibility	is	interpreted	in	relation	to	methodologies	employed	in	research,	the	relation	between	these	interpretations	and	the	degree	of	control	that	researchers	have	on	their	environment,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	rely	on	statistical	inference.	This	is	not	meant	to	be	an	exhaustive	list,	nor	is	it	meant	to	apply	accurately	to	all	existing	instances	of	the	examples	being	mentioned.	Rather,	it	is	meant	to	convey	a	sense	of	the	patterns	and	methodological	standards	characterizing	different	parts	of	the	scientific	world,	and	the	diversity	of	assumptions	and	practices	that	can	be	associated	with	the	ideal	of	reproducibility	in	research.			
1	Computational	Reproducibility		Radder’s	definition	of	reproducibility	is	perhaps	best	matched	by	the	practices	of	software	development	and	validation	used	in	computer	science	and	informatics,	where	researchers	focus	on	finding	and	resolving	mistakes	and	bugs	in	data	analysis	by	running	the	same	data	through	a	given	set	of	algorithms	over	and	over	again.	Here	it	is	not	only	possible,	but	actually	necessary	to	reduce	any	source	of	variation	other	than	in	the	software	or	statistical	tools	being	used	to	a	minimum,	so	as	to	spot	whatever	error	may	have	infiltrated	the	system.	As	discussed	in	a	recent	volume	aimed	to	provide	an	overview	of	reproducibility	techniques,	a	well-established	way	to	capture	this	is	the	idea	of	“computational	reproducibility”:	“A	research	project	is	computationally	reproducible	if	a	second	investigator	[..]	can	recreate	the	final	reported	results	of	the	project,	including	key	quantitative	findings,	tables,	and	figures,	given	only	a	set	of	files	and	written	instructions.”	(Kitzes	2016,	12).	A	paper	published	in	Science	in	2011	usefully	links	this	interpretation	of	reproducibility	with	the	use	of	minimal	standards	for	publishing	meta-data	within	computational	science.	As	shown	in	their	graphical	illustration	of	what	they	call	“reproducibility	spectrum”,	captured	in	figure	2	below,	this	view	of	reproducibility	does	not	involve	replicating	the	circumstances	of	data	production,	but	rather	being	able	to	obtain	the	same	outcomes	when	running	a	given	dataset	through	the	same	algorithms.			
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Figure	2.	Reproducibility	spectrum	according	to	Peng	(2011),	redrawn	by	
Michel	Durinx.		
		
2	Direct	Experimental	Reproducibility:	Standardised	Experiments		The	circumstances	of	data	production	are,	by	contrast,	a	primary	concern	for	experimentalists,	and	indeed	computational	reproducibility	is	hardly	applicable	to	experimental	research,	where	one	is	unavoidably	confronted	with	variation.	At	the	same	time,	there	is	significant	disagreement	among	experimental	fields	concerning	what	is	seen	as	a	desirable	and	realistic	degree	of	standardisation	and	control	over	environmental	variables.	In	clinical	trials	aimed	to	test	the	safety	and	efficacy	of	given	drugs	vis-à-vis	human	populations,	the	degree	of	controls	and	standardization	being	implemented	is	among	the	most	impressive	and	tightly	scrutinized	within	the	biomedical	realm.	Experiments	conducted	in	particle	accelerators	in	physics	are	similarly	controlled,	the	focus	on	one	centralized	experimental	apparatus	being	particularly	helpful	in	establishing	a	fixed	framework	within	which	experiments	can	be	successfully	repeated.	The	concept	of	reproducibility	pursued	in	such	settings	is	what	I	shall	hereafter	refer	to	as	‘direct	reproducibility’:	the	ability	to	obtain	the	same	results	through	the	repeated	application	of	the	same	research	methods.	This	is	as	close	to	computational	reproducibility	as	it	can	get	within	the	experimental	sciences,	though	nobody	–	particularly	in	clinical	science	-	would	expect	a	complete	and	exact	match	between	the	results	of	different	runs	of	the	same	experiment.	Rather,	what	is	expected	is	a	strong	similarity	in	the	datasets	and	a	match	in	the	patterns	inferred	from	the	data	(KNAW	2018).		This	is	typically	evaluated	through	recourse	to	statistical	inference,	thus	privileging	statistics	as	a	key	validating	tool	for	reasoning	from	evidence.4		
3	Scoping,	Indirect	and	Hypothetical	Reproducibility:	Semi-Standardised	
Experiments		Most	 experiments	 are	 carried	 out	 under	 conditions	 that	 are	 less	 tightly	controlled	than	clinical	research.	Such	experiments	are	best	described	as	semi-
                                               4	This	is	what	Julian	Reiss	called	“experimental	paradigm”	(Reiss	2015).	
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standardised:	 that	 is,	 where	 methods,	 set-up	 and	 materials	 used	 have	 been	construed	with	ingenuity	in	order	to	yield	very	specific	outcomes,	and	yet	some	significant	 parts	 of	 the	 set-up	 necessarily	 elude	 the	 controls	 set	 up	 by	experimenters.	 Typically,	 it	 is	 those	 ‘non-standardised’	 components	 that	 yield	the	most	valuable	epistemic	insights	for	researchers,	by	generating	confounding	results	 and	 enabling	 the	 exploration	 of	 new	 phenomena. 5 	One	 example	 is	research	 on	 model	 organisms,	 where	 researchers	 have	 spent	 decades	engineering	the	organisms	to	conform	to	specific	morphological,	developmental	and	behavioural	standards,	and	yet	the	behaviour	and	structure	of	the	organisms	remains	in	part	unpredictable	(a	veritable	‘sample	of	nature’;	Leonelli	2013)	and	highly	susceptible	to	subtle	shifts	in	environmental	circumstances,	ranging	from	nutrition	 to	 lighting	 and	 temperature	 (Ankeny	 and	 Leonelli	 2011,	 Reardon	2016).6	Another	example	is	psychological	experiments	on	social	groups	selected	because	 conforming	 to	 given	 physical,	 social	 and	 behavioural	 criteria,	 and	 yet	presenting	 unforeseen	 sources	 of	 variability	 of	 potential	 relevance	 to	 the	outcomes	being	generated.	A	third	notable	case	is	that	of	brain	scans	and	other	types	 of	 brain	 imaging	 in	 neuroscience,	 which	 are	 often	 affected	 by	imperceptible	 shifts	 in	 the	 subject’s	 mood	 and	 metabolism	 despite	 the	 tight	control	exercised	by	researchers	on	external	stimuli	(Turner	and	De	Haan	2017).			Within	 this	 type	 of	 research,	 it	 is	 common	 to	 find	 complaints	 about	 how	contextual	 differences	 between	 laboratory	 settings,	 research	 objects	 and	 other	environmental	 circumstances	 compromise	 the	extent	 to	which	 researchers	 can	aim	 for	 reproducibility.	 And	 yet,	 many	 researchers	 working	 under	 these	conditions	 do	 not	 aim	 for	 direct	 reproducibility.	 Some	 run	 experimental	reproductions	 to	 spot	 sources	 of	 variation	 that	 may	 prove	 significant	 when	interpreting	 the	 data	 at	 hand	 –	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 results	 obtained	on	model	organisms,	when	establishing	the	extent	to	which	a	given	outcome	can	be	reliably	imputed	to	organisms	beyond	those	originally	used	in	the	study.	This	is	an	interpretation	that	I	will	call	scoping	reproducibility.7			Others	 prefer	 other	 yet	 interpretations.	 One	 is	 indirect	 reproducibility	 that	focuses	 on	 obtaining	 similar	 results	 from	 the	 performance	 of	 different	experiment	(what	Radder	called	replicability),	and	constitutes	a	useful	validation	tool	to	see	whether	results	produced	under	variable	circumstances	converge	or	not.	 Another	 is	 what	 Felipe	 Romero	 calls	 hypothetical	 reproducibility	 (or	
                                               5	Mary	Morgan	(2012a,	296)	introduced	the	idea	of	confoundment	as	resulting	from	an	experimental	outcome	challenging	researchers’	existing	knowledge	of	the	world,	and	thus	leading	to	the	discovery	of	new	phenomena.	This	is	contrasted	to	the	surprise	triggered	by	model	experiments,	where	discovery	concerns	the	world	of	the	model,	rather	than	the	world	itself.	6	A	recent	Nature	article	complained	of	the	difficulties	in	controlling	for	environmental	variability	within	studies	on	mice:	“Mice	are	sensitive	to	minor	changes	in	food,	bedding	and	light	exposure.	It’s	 no	 secret	 that	 therapies	 that	 look	 promising	 in	mice	 rarely	work	 in	 people.	 But	 too	 often,	experimental	treatments	that	succeed	in	one	mouse	population	do	not	even	work	in	other	mice,	suggesting	that	many	rodent	studies	may	be	flawed	from	the	start.	Researchers	rarely	report	on	subtle	environmental	factors	such	as	their	mice’s	food,	bedding	or	exposure	to	light;	as	a	result,	conditions	 vary	widely	 across	 labs	 despite	 an	 enormous	 body	 of	 research	 showing	 that	 these	factors	can	significantly	affect	the	animals’	biology.	“It’s	sort	of	surprising	how	many	people	are	surprised	 by	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 variation”	 between	mice	 that	 receive	 different	 care,	 says	 Cory	Brayton,	a	pathologist	at	Johns	Hopkins	University	in	Baltimore,	Maryland.”	(Reardon	2016:	264)		7	I	thank	Mary	Morgan,	Hans	Radder	and	Stephan	Güttinger	for	discussions	on	this	point.	
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‘conceptual	 replication’	 in	psychologists’	 jargon;	Romero	2017):	 the	attempt	 to	obtain	outcomes	that	match	those	predicted	as	implications	of	previous	findings,	thereby	 confirming	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 previous	 findings.	 Both	 these	interpretations	 of	 reproducibility	 lean	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 convergence	 across	multiple	 lines	of	evidence,	even	when	they	are	produced	 in	different	ways,	 is	a	mark	of	 reliable	 research	 (a	 ‘tangle	of	 support’	 in	Chapman	and	Wylie’s	 terms,	2016).		
4	Reproducible	Expertise:	Non-Standard	Experiments	and	Research	on	Rare	
Materials			There	 are	 also	 experiments	 where	 control	 over	 environmental	 variability	 is	extremely	 limited,	 and	 standardisation	 very	 low.	 These	 are	 cases	 where	experimenters	 are	 studying	 new	 objects	 or	 phenomena	 (new	 organisms	 for	instance)	 and/or	 employing	 newly	 devised,	 unique	 instruments	 that	 are	precisely	tailored	to	the	inquiry	at	hand.8	Researchers	then	focus	less	on	controls	and	 more	 on	 developing	 robust	 ways	 of	 evaluating	 the	 effects	 of	 their	interventions	 and	 the	 relation	 between	 those	 effects	 and	 the	 experimental	circumstances	 at	 the	 time	 in	 which	 data	 were	 collected.	 Direct	 or	 indirect	reproducibility	 are	 not	 helpful	 concepts	 within	 this	 type	 of	 research.	 Notably,	however,	 the	 idea	 of	 reproducibility	 does	 not	 completely	 disappear,	 with	researchers	emphasising	the	reproducibility	of	the	expertise	–	the	specific	skills	and	 interpretive	 abilities	 –	 underpinning	 the	 conduct	 of	 research	 over	 the	reproducibility	 of	 the	 outcomes.	 I	 will	 refer	 to	 this	 interpretation	 of	reproducibility	as	reproducible	expertise,	and	define	it	as	the	expectation	that	any	skilled	 experimenter	 working	 with	 the	 same	 methods	 and	 the	 same	 type	 of	materials	at	that	particular	time	and	place	would	produce	similar	results.			Appeals	to	reproducible	expertise	are	also	characteristic	of	research	on	materials	that	are	rare,	unique,	perishable	and/or	inaccessible,	such	as	depletable	samples	stored	 in	 biobanks;	 unique	 specimens,	 such	 as	 specific	 botanical	 finds	 or	archaeological	remains;	or	materials	that	are	hard	or	expensive	to	access,	such	as	very	 costly	 strains	 of	 transgenic	 mice).	 These	 materials	 are	 not	 amenable	 to	repeated	 investigation	 as	 required	 by	 the	 direct	 and	 indirect	 forms	 of	reproducibility.	This	does	not	constitute	an	obstacle	to	using	such	materials	for	research,	since	the	uniqueness	and	irreproducibility	of	the	materials	is	arguably	what	 makes	 the	 resulting	 data	 particularly	 useful	 as	 evidence.	 The	 onus	 of	reproducibility	 shifts	 instead	 to	 the	 credibility	 and	 skills	 of	 the	 investigators	entrusted	 with	 handling	 these	 materials.	 Apposite	 methodologies	 have	 been	developed	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 impossibility	 to	 directly	 replicate	 the	 findings,	including	 vetted	 access,	 cross-samples	 research	 and	 the	 centralisation	 of	research	 in	 locations	 where	 several	 researchers	 can	work	 together	 and	 check	each	other’s	work	and	ensure	its	reliability	for	those	with	no	access	to	the	same	material	sources.			
                                               
8 Ed	Ramsden,	Rachel	Ankeny,	Nicole	Nelson	and	 I	discussed	models	of	organisms	 that	 include	environmental	 features	 and	 are	 uniquely	 tailored	 to	 the	 specific	 goals	 of	 a	 given	 inquiry	 as	‘situated	models’	(Ankeny	et	al	2014).		
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5	Reproducible	Observation:	Non-experimental	case	description		A	 tremendous	amount	of	research	 in	the	medical,	historical	and	social	sciences	does	not	rest	on	experimentation,	but	rather	on	observational	techniques	such	as	surveys,	 descriptions	 and	 case	 reports	 documenting	 unique	 circumstances	(Morgan	 2012b).	 Such	 research	 is,	 again,	 not	 replicable	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 direct,	indirect	or	even	hypothetical	reproducibility	(Boumans	2015)	and	yet,	as	in	the	case	 of	 non-standard	 experiments,	 there	 is	 an	 emphasis	 on	 reproducibility	 of	observation	 -	 the	 expectation	 being	 that	 any	 skilled	 researcher	 placed	 in	 the	same	 time	 and	 place	 would	 pick	 out,	 if	 not	 the	 same	 data,	 at	 least	 similar	patterns.	In	other	words,	one	can	learn	to	observe	in	very	specific,	reproducible	ways.	Examples	are	the	practices	of	comparative	multi-sited	ethnography,	where	researchers	 are	 trained	 to	 observe	 similar	 phenomena	 across	 very	 different	circumstances;	 structured	 interviewing,	 where	 researchers	 devise	 a	 relatively	rigid	 framing	 for	 their	 interactions	 with	 informants;	 and	 diagnosis	 based	 on	radiographies,	 resonance	 scans	 and	 other	 medical	 imaging	 techniques,	 where	skilled	observation	by	expert	physicians	 is	crucial	 to	extracting	meaningful	and	reliable	information.		
6	Irreproducible	Research:	Participant	Observation		At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	from	computational	reproducibility	there	is	research	where	the	idea	of	reproducibility	has	been	rejected	in	favor	of	an	embrace	of	the	subjectivity	and	unavoidable	context-dependence	of	research	outcomes.	Researchers	working	with	highly	idiosyncratic,	situated	findings	are	well-aware	that	they	cannot	rely	on	reproducibility	as	an	epistemic	criterion	for	data	quality	and	validity.	They	therefore	devote	considerable	care	to	documenting	data	production	processes	and	strategizing	about	data	preservation	and	dissemination.	In	other	words,	they	prioritize	sophisticated	strategies	for	enhancing	the	accountability	of	their	methods	and	data	management	strategies,	as	well	as	the	long-term	preservation	of	the	instruments,	techniques	and	materials	through	which	results	were	generated.	The	very	fact	that	different	observers	have	different	viewpoints	and	produce	different	data	and	interpretations	is	here	used	as	a	starting	point	for	assessing	and	validating	research	results.	Ethnographic	work	in	anthropology,	for	instance,	has	developed	methods	to	account	for	the	fact	that	data	are	likely	to	change	depending	on	time,	place,	subjects	as	well	as	researchers’	moods,	experiences	and	interests.	Key	among	such	methods	is	the	principle	of	reflexivity,	which	requires	researchers	to	give	as	comprehensive	a	view	of	their	personal	circumstances	during	research	as	possible,	so	as	to	enable	readers	to	evaluate	how	the	focus	of	attention,	emotional	state	and	existing	commitments	of	the	researchers	at	the	time	of	the	investigation	may	have	affected	their	results.	Much	can	be	learnt	within	the	quantitative	sciences	from	this	approach,	which	explicitly	and	publicly	discusses	the	methodological	commitments	and	processual	nature	of	the	research	(including	the	ways	in	which	investigators	
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change	their	work	in	response	to	shifting	circumstances,	problems	and	mistakes	in	everyday	practice),	and	makes	a	virtue	out	of	the	unavoidable	variation	among	studies	carried	out	at	different	times,	by	different	groups	and	in	different	places.					
Table	1.	Synoptic	view	of	types	of	research	design/methods	and	related	
understanding	of	reproducibility	discussed	in	section	3.		
Type	of	
research	
Example	 Degree	of	
control	on		
environment	
Reliance	on	
statistics	as	
inferential	tool	
Reproducible	in	which	
sense?	
	Software	development	 Computer	engineering,	informatics		
Total	 High	 Computational	R:	Obtain	same	results	from	the	same	data.	Standardised	experiments	 Clinical	trials,	environmental	safety	controls	
Very	high	 High	 Direct	R:	Obtain	same	results	from	different	runs	of	the	same	experiment.	Semi-standardised	experiments		
Behavioural	economics,	experimental	psychology,	research	on	model	organisms	
Limited	 Variable	 Scoping	R:	Use	differences	in	results	to	identify	relevant	variation.	
Indirect	R:	Obtain	same	results	from	different	experiments.		
Hypothetical	R:	corroborate	results	implied	by	previous	findings.	Non-standard	experiments	&	research	based	on	rare,	unique,	perishable,	inaccessible	materials	
Research	on	experimental	organisms,	archeology,	paleontology,	history	
Low	 Low	 Reproducible	Expertise:	Any	skilled	experimenter	working	with	same	methods	and	materials	would	produce	similar	results	
Non-experimental	case	description	
Case	reports	in	medicine,	(types	of)	multi-sited	ethnography		
None	 Low	 Reproducible	Observation:	Any	skilled	observer	would	pick	out	similar	patterns	
Participant	observation	 Ethology,	participant	observation	in	anthropology	
None	 None	 Irreproducible	Observation:	different	observers	are	assumed	to	have	different	viewpoints	and	produce	
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different	data	and	interpretations		
Beyond	the	Ideal	of	Direct	Reproducibility		The	idea	that	reproducibility,	interpreted	univocally	as	the	reproduction	of	the	same	outcomes	by	the	same	methods,	cannot	work	as	an	overarching	criterion	for	evaluating	the	quality	and	reliability	of	research	is	by	no	means	new.	A	well-known	critic	of	this	view	is	Harry	Collins,	whose	seminal	book	Changing	Order	argued	that	the	vast	majority	of	experiments	are	never	replicated,	and	even	in	the	few	cases	where	replication	is	attempted,	it	is	not	always	successful	(Collins	1985).	It	is	nevertheless	interesting	to	note	that	while	critical	of	the	use	of	reproducibility	as	a	descriptive	and	evaluative	tool,	Collins	is	sympathetic	to	the	use	of	reproducibility	as	a	regulatory	ideal	for	science:	“even	though	replication	is	beset	by	problems,	one	must	stick	to	it	as	the	fundamental	way	of	showing	that	scientific	results	are	secure.	Science	is	a	matter	of	having	the	right	aspirations	even	if	they	cannot	be	fulfilled”	(Collins	2017).				I	disagree	with	this	view.	Seeing	reproducibility	as	a	key	aspiration	for	science	brings	us	back	to	the	Popperian	view	that	reproducibility,	at	least	heuristically,	demarcates	good	from	bad	science.	There	are	good	reasons	to	resist	the	temptation	to	impute	such	decisive	epistemic	power	to	reproducibility.	As	I	discussed,	this	ideal	is	applied	very	differently	depending	on	research	fields,	materials	and	goals.	Nevertheless,	reproducibility	as	currently	discussed	in	science	and	science	policy	is	often	linked	to	the	expectation	that	researchers	can	and	should	be	able	to	exercise	a	high	level	of	control	over	the	circumstances,	environment	and	materials	employed	in	a	study.	Insisting	on	this	interpretation	of	reproducibility,	particularly	within	funding	and	assessment	structures,	can	push	researchers	to	place	less	emphasis	on	carefully	reporting	the	more	idiosyncratic	aspects	of	their	research,	and	instead	focus	on	producing	general	protocols	that	do	not	linger	on	the	specific	characteristics	of	their	local	situation.	It	can	also	be	interpreted	as	incentivising	researchers	to	focus	less	attention	on	the	variation	characterizing	their	results,	and	the	extent	to	which	such	variation	can	affect	the	reliability	and	scope	of	their	conclusions.	This	situation	carries	significant	epistemic	risks.	As	reported	by	Nature,	“researchers	rarely	report	on	subtle	environmental	factors	such	as	their	mice’s	food,	bedding	or	exposure	to	light;	as	a	result,	conditions	vary	widely	across	labs	despite	an	enormous	body	of	research	showing	that	these	factors	can	significantly	affect	the	animals’	biology”	(Reardon	2016).	A	contrasting	and	more	productive	attitude	is	to	repeat	experiments	not	as	a	way	to	reproduce	results,	but	rather	as	a	way	to	uncover	sources	of	variation	and	explore	their	significance	(what	I	already	discussed	under	the	label	of	‘scoping	reproducibility’).			Generally,	the	emphasis	on	a	narrow	interpretation	of	reproducibility	is	linked	with	a	devaluing	of	the	role	of	expertise	and	embodied	knowledge	in	data	production,	processing	and	assessment.	These	are	instead	highly	valued	and	well-accounted	for	in	qualitative	research	traditions	that	focus	on	the	critical	evaluation	of	data	in	light	of	the	situatedness	of	human	perspective	and	the	local	
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nature	of	research	methods	and	materials.	This	results	in	much	useful	work	on	the	meta-data	that	should	accompany	and	guide	the	analysis	of	any	given	dataset	(e.g.	Zahle	2018),	and	the	insights	that	can	be	gained	when	obtaining	diverse	outcomes	from	the	same	research	process.	It	also	fosters	research	on	triangulation	techniques	aiming	to	compare	and	integrate	results	coming	from	different	traditions,	locations,	sources	and	methodologies,	which	in	turn	facilitates	testing	whether	any	given	inference	is	robust	in	the	face	of	different	lines	of	evidence.		Given	these	issues,	it	is	important	to	ask	why	direct	reproducibility	proves	so	attractive	as	an	ideal	to	which	research	should	aspire.	An	insightful	explanation	for	the	epistemic	power	attributed	to	this	approach	is	provided	by	another	critic	of	this	view,	John	Norton.	His	skepticism	is	grounded	partly	in	the	observation	that	“a	failure	of	replication	may	not	impugn	a	credible	experimental	result;	and	a	successful	replication	can	fail	to	vindicate	an	incredible	experimental	result”;	and	partly	in	the	view	that	whether	or	not	an	experiment	may	be	viewed	as	successfully	replicated	is	determined	by	whichever	background	facts	researchers	appeal	to	when	evaluating	the	experiment	and	its	results.	As	Norton	notes,	“commonly,	these	background	facts	do	support	successful	replication	as	a	good	evidential	guide	and	this	has	fostered	the	illusion	of	a	deeper,	exceptionless	principle”	(Norton	2015).	In	other	words,	researchers	that	pursue	direct	reproducibility	have	been	so	successful	at	engineering	cohesive	experimental	systems	that	highly	controlled	experiments	have	come	to	exemplify	the	very	best	of	research	practices,	in	ways	that	do	no	justice	to	other	research	methods,	and	particularly	to	qualitative	traditions.		
Conclusion:	The	Epistemic	Value	of	Irreproducible	Research		We	have	seen	how	direct	reproducibility	works	best	in	research	environments	characterized	by	a	high	standardization	of	methods	and	materials,	a	high	degree	of	control	over	environmental	variability	and	reliable	and	relevant	methods	of	statistical	inference.	It	should	not	be	surprising	that	research	that	strays	from	these	conditions	–	such	as	exploratory,	non-standard	research	carried	out	on	unique	samples	and	under	highly	variable	environmental	conditions	-	has	trouble	conforming	to	this	interpretation	of	reproducibility,	and	I	have	suggested	here	that	such	conformity	is	neither	fruitful	nor	desirable.	In	non-standard	types	of	inquiry,	researchers	typically	recognize	that	direct	reproducibility	cannot	function	as	an	epistemic	criterion	for	research	quality,	and	instead	devote	care	and	critical	thinking	on	documenting	data	production	processes,	examining	the	variation	among	their	materials	and	environmental	conditions,	and	strategizing	about	data	preservation	and	dissemination.	Within	qualitative	research	traditions,	explicitly	side-stepping	the	ideal	of	(direct)	reproducibility	has	helped	researchers	to	improve	the	reliability	and	accountability	of	their	research	practices	and	data.			This	is	rarely	acknowledged	in	scientific	debates,	but	there	are	some	interesting	
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exceptions,	particularly	as	the	reproducibility	debate	is	reaching	maturity	and	the	initial	polemical	tones	are	being	replaced	by	more	sophisticated	reasoning.		A	recent	example	is	a	piece	written	by	the	editor	of	Science	journals	in	January	2018,	where	he	defends	the	steps	taken	within	the	journals	to	improve	reproducibility,	but	also	notes	that			 “Another	approach	to	assess	reproducibility	involved	an	experimental	program	that	attempted	to	replicate	selected	findings	in	cancer	biology	by	groups	not	involved	with	the	original	studies	(see	https://elifesciences.org/collections/9b1e83d1/reproducibility-project-cancer-biology).	Although	some	findings	were	largely	reproduced,	in	at	least	one	case	(which	was	published	in	Science),	the	key	finding	was	not.	Yet,	the	initial	results	have	been	utilized	and	extended	in	published	studies	from	several	other	laboratories.	This	case	reinforces	the	notion	that	reproducibility,	certainly	in	cancer	biology,	is	quite	nuanced,	and	considerable	care	must	be	taken	in	evaluating	both	initial	reports	and	reported	attempts	at	extension	and	replication.	Clear	description	of	experimental	details	is	essential	to	facilitate	these	efforts.	The	increased	use	of	preprint	servers	such	as	bioRxiv	by	the	biological	and	biomedical	communities	may	play	a	role	in	facilitating	communication	of	successful	and	unsuccessful	replication	results.”	(Berg	2018)	This	is	an	important	step	towards	acknowledging	that	the	circumstances	of	reproducibility	differs	across	research	fields.	It	falls	short	of	an	acknowledgement	that	reproducibility	itself	can	come	in	different	guises,	and	sometimes	be	instrumental	to	a	different	epistemic	purpose	or	altogether	irrelevant.	Here	again,	the	editorial	equates	science	with	experimentation,	thereby	excluding	non-experimental	sciences	from	consideration.	What	is	a	credible	alternative	to	the	current	tendency	to	rely	on	narrow	forms	of	reproducibility	as	a	fail-proof	criterion	for	what	should	be	trusted	as	good	science?	One	option	is	to	recognise	the	importance	of	reproducibility	as	a	strategy	to	interrogate	variation	across	results,	rather	than	to	validate	the	outcomes	of	research.	Another	option	is	to	focus	on	the	idea	of	convergence	or	triangulation	of	results,	as	discussed	above.	Perhaps	the	strongest	advocate	of	that	view	in	philosophy	has	been	Hacking,	when	arguing	that	scientific	results	can	be	trusted	when	the	elements	of	laboratory	science	are	brought	into	mutual	consistency	and	support,	match	each	other	and	become	“mutually	self-vindicating”	(Hacking	1992,	56).9		A	third	alternative	is	to	tailor	reproducibility	requirements	to	the	circumstances	and	goals	of	any	specific	project	or	area	of	research,	while	at	the	same	time	learning	from	situations	where	insisting	on	reproducible	results	is	neither	realistic	nor	significant	to	assessing	the	quality	of	a	given	study.	Researchers	who	cannot	rely	on	reproducibility	as	an	epistemic	
                                               
9 The	elements	that	Hacking	singles	out	include	“(1)	ideas:	questions,	background	knowledge,	systematic	theory,	topical	hypotheses,	and	modeling	of	the	apparatus;	(2)	things:	target,	source	of	modification,	detectors,	tools,	and	data	generators;	and	(3)	marks	and	the	manipulation	of	marks:	data,	data	assessment,	data	reduction,	data	analysis,	and	interpretation”	(Hacking	1992,	56)	–	thus	potentially	embracing	research	beyond	the	experimental	sciences. 
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criterion	for	quality	and	validity	tend	to	devote	more	care	and	critical	thinking	to	accounting	for	research	methods	and	circumstances	–	for	instance	by	documenting	data	production	processes	(including	the	mood	and	circumstances	of	individual	researchers)	and	strategizing	about	the	preservation	and	dissemination	of	related	instruments,	protocols	and	materials.		Indeed,	many	scientific	communities	and	Open	Science	advocates	focus	their	efforts	on	fostering	public	discussion	of	researchers’	methodological	commitments	and	everyday	practices.	In	consultation	with	learned	societies	and	experts	in	qualitative	research,	funding	bodies	and	research	organisations	should	mirror	these	efforts	by	providing	researchers	with	incentives	and	guidelines	to	explicitly	discuss	not	only	their	methods,	but	also	the	ways	in	which	they	learn	from	unexpected	and	incongruent	findings.	Furthermore,	overt	discussions	should	include	strategies	to	preserve	research	components	and	materials	in	the	longer	term,	particularly	in	situations	where	hard	choices	need	to	be	made	about	which	instrument,	software,	material	and	meta-data	it	is	actually	possible	(and	realistic)	to	store,	and	how.	A	frank	discussion	of	the	extent	to	which	everyday	research	practice	deviates	from	idealised	reproducibility	standards	is	not	only	possible,	but	crucial	to	the	exercise	of	critical	scrutiny	and	constant	questioning	of	established	knowledge	that	Popper	himself	viewed	as	markers	of	good	science.	The	goal	of	such	open	exchange	should	not	be	to	punish	research	approaches	where	computational	or	direct	reproducibility	is	not	possible	or	relevant,	but	rather	to	acknowledge	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	different	ways	of	validating	results,	and	learn	as	much	as	possible	from	the	methodological	precepts	that	guide	different	parts	of	science.			
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